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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
ACQUnING TuRscITON iN GARNISHMENT PRocsgNos.-Garnishment is
a proceeding provided by statutes found in every state, for the purpose of
laying hold of something belonging to a defendant or judgment debtor but
actually in the hands of someone else, and appropriating it to pay the debt
due from the defendant or judgment debtor. If the proceeding i3 instituted
ancillary to a pending suit, and before judgment, it is a species of attach-
ment. If it is issued ancillary to a judgment already recovered it is a spe-
cies of execution. If the third person summoned as garnishee is merely
bailee of property belonging to the judgment debtor or defendant the gar-
nishment differs from an actual levy into the hands of the sheriff under an
attachment or execution only in the fact that the actual custody and posses-
sion remain with the garnishee instead of passing to the hands of the sheriff.
If the garnishee has nothing in his hands belonging to the principal defend-
ant and is only indebted to him, the garnishment merely stops payment, cre-
ates a lien on the sum due, and eventually causes the garnishee to pay into
court for the benefit of the plaintiff instead of paying to the defendant ac-
cording to his original liability. To repeat, it is in substance a seizure of
the principal defendant's goods or choses in all cases, and appropriation of
them to satisfaction of his obligations.
Statement of these aphorisms is prompted by the decision of the Supreme
Court of Michigan in Katt v. Swartz (1917), i65 N. W. 717, sustaining a
plea of payment into court in garnishment as an absolute bar to suit against
the garnishee by his creditor, and at the same time saying that the judgment
against the principal debtor (the garnishee's creditor) in the proceedings to
which the garnishment was ancillary was void because the summons to the
debtor in that proceeding was issued and served only four days before the
return day instead of from six to twelve days before, as required by the
statute.
The statement of the court that the judgment against the principal de-
fendant was void was not necessary to the decision. The question as to the
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effect of that adjudication as a judgment in personam was not before the
court. The meaning of the court may fairly be interpreted to be this: ad-
mitting for the sake of argument that the judgment against the principal
debtor is void as a judgment in personam, it was sufficient to give the court
jurisdiction in rem to the extent that the judgment against the garnishee and
his payment under it divested the principal defendant of his right of action
against the garnishee. If that was not the meaning of the court, it cer-
tainly is the effect of the judgment; for, as stated in the opening paragraph,
garnishment is essentially and unavoidably in rein as to the principal de-
fendant's property.
If the owner of anything is deprived of it by a judicial proceeding to
which he is in no way a party, he is not bound by the decision. If he has
not had his day in court the decision is either res inter alios acta or it is
coram non judice. A corollary of this proposition, admitted by all courts,
and often declared and applied by the Supreme Court of Michigan, is that
if the proceeding against the principal defendant is void, payment by the
garnishee of a judgment rendered against him is no protection to him against
an action by the principal defendant. Laidlaw v. Morrow, 44 Mich. 547;
Coe v. Hinkley, io9 Mich. 6o8; Moore v. Speed, 55 Mich. 84.
Therefore, interpreting the instant case in the only way in which it is
possible to interpret it, it decided that failure to comply with the statutory
form (in this case relating to the notice to the principal defendant) does
not render the statutory proceeding in; rem void, so as to expose it to col-
lateral attack. Recognizing this fact, we impulsively rise to applause and
acclamation, as we see the Supreme Court of Michigan turning away from
the heresy promulgated in this state away back in 1847, in the case of Green-
vault v. Farmers and Mechanics' Bank, 2 Doug. 498, and wheeling into line
with the increasing procession following the lead of the Supreme Court of
the United States in the case of Voorhees v. The Bank of the United States,
io Peters 449; Cooper v. Reynolds, 77 U. S. (io Wall.) 308; etc.
The Supreme Court of Michigan was the original sinner, the first state
to go astray. She has persisted in her error started in 2 Doug. 498 for many
years, and has misled others. The Supreme Court of Nebraska followed
her lead for several years, but finally in Darnell v. Mack (1896), 46 Neb. 740,
discovered her error and turned to the right. For review of other cases see
article in i MicH. L. Ri. 645, on "Collateral Attacks Based on Irregulari-
ties". Let us hope that the instant case marks a definite change of policy by
our Supreme Court. The principal debtor in the instant case was personally
served with summons in the same town in which the suit in garnishment was
tried, four days before the trial. He had ample opportunity to appear and
make defense if he had any on the merits or cared to raise objection to the
jurisdiction; or, as suggested by Mr. Justice STmlEa in his opinion, he might
have appealed or sued certiorari. He did none of these things, but preferred
collateral attack. There is no suggestion or suspicion that the length of the
notice to him caused him any inconvenience or in any way embarrassed his
defense. On what basis should he be allowed to make collateral attack?
J. R. R.
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